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Perspective of the Law of Treaties)
Damos Durooli Agnsman*
Keberadaan the Area sebagai tempat yang memiliki
potensi sumber daya alam yang besar, telah menjadi
sumber konftik khususnya mengenai hak efaplorasi di
tempat tersebut Untuk iiu, UNCLOS Iff telah
memberikan solusi penetapan status the Area sebagai
Common Heritage of All Mankind yang diatur dalam
rezim kukum khusus. Lahirnya rezim ini mendapat
tentangan dart Amerika Serikat dan beberapa negara
industri lainrya yang menginginkan agar wilayah me
Area diberlahtkan "first come first serve regime" atau
freedom of high seas. Permasalahan berikutnya adalak
apakah rezim khusas ini dapat berlakujaga bagi Negara
yang bukan mentpakan pihak dari UNCLOS IU seperti
Amerika Serikat?
The Seabed regime (the Area) is a newly emerging regime
adopted within the LOSC 1982. The regime is intended to translate
the concept of common heritage of mankind (CHM) into
institutional reality, by establishing International Seabed Authority,
* The Writer is currently the Director for Legal and Treaties on Economic
and Socio-Cultural Afiairs, Department of Foreign Affairs of me Republic of
Indonesia,
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whose functions are to organize and control activities in the area,
particularly -with a view to administering the resources of the area
(Art 157). It is very unique since the authority will be a first
international organization which -will have its own resources., and
will have jurisdiction over vast areas of the globe.
The CHM principle itself has been universally accepted by
the adoption of UNGA Resolution 2749, 1970 (on Declaration of
Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the
Subsoil Thereof, beyond the limits of National Jurisdiction), but
how to interpret the principle was a very controversial issue which
divided states into two group. There were two fundamentally
different interpretation of CHM principle. The technologically-
advanced states contend that the CHM principle does not preclude
the freedom to unilaterally explore and exploit the resources of the
Sea Bed. On the other hand, the developing nations adhere to the
contention that the principle is a general rule of international law
prohibits unilateral mining. The latter attempts to develop the CHM
principle in pursuance to the notion of so-called establishing art
internationcd economic order- They do not only contend that the
seabed can not be subject to appropriation but also claim that all
countries must share in the management of the region and then
further, there must be an active sharing of the benefits reaped from
the exploitation of the Area's resources. This progressive principle
is eventually reflected in the LOSC 1982, and of course, this
allegedly excessive demand could not meet the formers interest
The law-making nature of the LOSC 1982, particularly
when it creates a regime for a common space property of the Area,
inevitably requires as a prerequisite a universal acceptance of the
Convention. The regime it creates will not work without universal
participation of all states. It had been assumed before that all states
would be parties to the Convention since the negotiation approach
was based on consensual and package deal nature, but
unpredictably, at the nearly-conclusion session, Reagan
Administration through its shift foreign policy so-called
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"negotiation from strength",1 could not accept the far-reaching
consensus on controversial issue of seabed regime and brought
about non-universaily acceptance of the Convention.
The present non-universal situation, which was obviously
unthinkable and unpredictable during the negotiation, raised a big
question about the legal status of the seabed regime. The paramount
aim of a desirable seabed regime for resource exploration and
exploitation can not be achieved if there are third states outside the
LOSC 1982 who ignore the regime by claiming an open right to use
the seabed resources and authorize their nationals and vessels to
mine there. In pursuing this problem most authors emphasize on
ineffectiveness of the seabed regime rather than its legality. It is
beyond doubt that the existence of multi regimes would not only
affect the effectiveness of the regime but, which is most important,
create a conflict of a legal norm where the practical and legal nature
of the regime would most likely be far more uncertain.2
The essential feature of seabed regime is that it is creating
an international regime upon the Area, by converting from the high
seas regime into seabed/CHM regime. The regime is intended to
embrace "all states". Accordingly, it is suggested to be seen not as a
contracts having effect for state parties but an instruments intending
to establish general rules applied for all states. The wording of the
seabed regime clearly indicates this feature. The LOSC 1982,
particularly the regime provisions, uses various terms of subjects
such as "coastal states", "developing states", "all states", "every
state", and "no state" in every different context. This kind of
wording should be presumed as refer to states generally regardless
parties or not to the Convention. A definition has been given by the
LOSC 1982, but it is only to the term "state parties" ('State parties'
1 "Negotiation from strength" is a well-known phrase describes the
character of Reagan Administration's foreign policy. This hard line policy was
particularly directed to the Soviet Union, then penetrated to other strategy-
concerned areas such as UNCLOS ID.
2 Grolin, Jesper, The Future of fee Law of the Sea, ODIL, 1984, p. 20.
yohane 4 Nomor 2 Jamtari 2097 425
Jumal Huhtm Internasianal
mean states which have consented to be bound by this Convention
and for which this Convention is in force (Art. 1.1.2(1) the LOSC
1982). Therefore, the regime, as might be said of the whole Con-
vention, declares certain rights and imposes obligations on all
states.
Consequently, another problem emerges, if there are some
states stay outside the LOSC 1982, it might lead to a strong
argument that such regime is in breach of the principle ofpacta
tertiis nee nocent nee prosunt, that a treaty does not create either
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Art
36, rules out the possibility to accord rights to all states if the state
parties intend to do so. The wording such as "all states" of the
LOSC 1982 indicates such an intention. But, interestingly, the
regime also imposes obligations which, according to Art 35 of The
Vienna Convention, requires not only such intention but also
expressly and written acceptance of the non-party to such
obligations.
There is a strict view that the LOSC 1982 has a contractual
nature which binding only state parties, based on ancient maxim of
pacta tertiis nee nocent nee prosunf, and might aSect third parties
by virtue of customs as ruled out by Art 38 Vienna Convention.3
Most writers then take the view that the some rules of LOSC 1982
declares customary rules, some other have passed into, and the rest
is going to pass into customary rules. It can be said of Part XI
(Area), in spite of the absence of state practices (mere no yet exists
established practices of states in exploration and exploitation over
the seabed area), and the rule could instantly pass into customary
law.4 This traditional argument seems resolve the problem. By
3 Lee, Luke T, the Law of the Sea Convention and Third States, AJIL,
1983, Vol.77, p. 565.
* It is in the line of Bin Cheng aigumeul about instant customary law, see
Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: Instant" International
Customary Law", Indian Journal of International Law, 1965.
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claiming that the LOSC 1982 will folly pass into customary rules,
they contend that the seabed regime will be valid to all states. But,
the legal constraint is still unavoidable, since the existence of
persistent objector rules may prevent non-party states to be bound
by the Convention. United States is in the good position to invoke
this rule because from the beginning (i.e. voted against the UNGA
Moratorium Resolution 2574,1969) it has persistently objected that
the CHM principle include the prohibition of unilateral mining in
the Seabed area.
One might argue that the persistent objector rule is only
temporary or strategic value in the evolution of rules of inter-
national law. For instances, US, UK, and Japan objections to ex-
panded coastal state jurisdiction were ultimately to no avail, and
they have been forced to accede to 12-mile territorial sea and 200-
mile EEZ,5 on the way around, Norway persistently objection with
regard to normal baseline, lasted by the adoption of straight
baselines principle in Geneva Convention 1958, and Germany
objection to equidistance principle, eventually accepted by LOSC
1982. ft is clear then, that the existence of persistent objector rule
eventually will be resolved or determined by the market forces of
international community.
However, despite the fact that the seabed regime might
eventually pass into customary rules and be valid to all states, it is
still debatable whether it is appropriate to deal with the legal force
of the regime by the strict view of the principle ofpacta tertiis nee
nocent nee prosunt or alternatively by virtue of customs. The very
entirely nature or the undivided character of the regime which
necessitate universally acceptance by all states, leads to the strong
suggestion that it should be approached under particular concept of
international law beyond such traditional methods. Accordingly, it
is worth reexamining the legal nature of the seabed regime and
particularly its legal effects to third parties in a more appropriate
manner.
5 Charaey, Jonathan 1, the Persistent Objector Rule and the Development
of Customary International Law, BYB+1985, p.21-22.
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It is a general principle that a treaty does not create either
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent. But
Waldock, a special Rapporteur to the ILC drafting the Vienna
Convention recommended that provisions be included to recognize
that, in two instances, a treaty can create rights and duties for third
states. The first occurs where a treaty establishes an objective
regime, creating rights and obligations erga omnes. The second
arises where a treaty becomes binding upon a third State because it
actually declares a rule of customary international law. Sometime a
treaty may lead to the general acceptance of a norm of customary
law which accordingly will bind non-parties.6
Brierly also indicated that international law has begun to
recognize that some treaties have an objective, legislative character,
for example where they create international situations or entities
binding upon all states, whether contracting parties or not Such as
the Aaland Island Convention of 1856, this neutralized those islands
in the Baltic and which was held by a commission of jurists
established by the League Council to be objectively valid erga
omnes. The Suez Canal Convention of 1908 and the clauses of the
Versailles Treaty concerning the Kiel Canal, both of which
converted the Canals into international waterways. Then the UN
Charter.7
McNair pointed out the existence of a kind of constitutive or
semi-legislative treaties or treaties of a public law character which
frequently embody the decision of a powerful group of states, acting
or assuming to act in the public interest Likewise, The Reparation
for Injuries Case 1949, noted the existence of international
organizations of states which possess international personality for
the purpose of a claim that exercisable against all states whether
member or non-member.8
6 Triggs, Gillian, International Law and Australian Sovereignty in
Antarctica, Sydney, 19S6, p. 140-144.
7 Triggs, Ibid, p. 144.
* Sinclair, f, Vienna Convention an the Law of Treaties, 1984, p. 104-105.
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Starke also recognize that certain multilateral Convention
which are intended to have universal operation, may provide in
terms for their application to non-parties. Such as Single Con-
vention on Narcotic Drugs concluded at New York 1961, enabled
an international organ finally to determine the estimates for legit-
imate narcotic drug requirements of States., not parties to the
Convention.9
Legal writings thus supports the notion that treaties estab-
lishing objective regime may have effects erga omnes. Interest-
ingly, Waldock concluded his work for the ELC with the recommen-
dation that a treaty establishes an objective regime when it appears
from its terms and to create in the general interest general
obligations and rights relating to particular region, State, territory,
locality, river, waterways, or to a particular area of sea, sea-bed, or
air space—!0
Internationa] Law Commission in drafting Vienna
Convention particularly in dealing with the matter of "treaties and
third states" tried to cover the objective regime. Some members ex-
pressed the view that the concept of treaties creating objective
regimes existed in international law and merited special treatment in
the draft articles. In their view, treaties which fall within this
concept are treaties for the neutralization or demilitarization of
particular territories or areas, and treaties providing for freedom of
navigation in international rivers or maritime waterways; and they
cited the Antarctic Treaty as a recent example of such a treaty.
Other members, however, while recognizing that in certain eases
treaty rights and obligations may come to be valid erga omnes
considered that these cases resulted from the grafting of an
international custom upon a treaty. Since there was no agreement
with regard to the source of such effect, the Commission decided to
leave this question aside in drafting articles. It must not therefore be
assumed that the deliberate decision of the ILC not to make special
9 Starke, G, An Introduction to International Law, 1977, p. 466.
10 Triggs, Op. Cit, p. 144.
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provision for objective regimes constitutes a denial of the existence
of this category of treaties. It constitutes at most a denial of the need
for a special rule to explain the relationship between treaties
creating objective regimes and third states. It can be seen then
from the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of
Treaties, which acknowledges the objective regime valid erga
omnes12. In its commentary to this Convention, the ILC reaffirmed
that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, does not
except treaties intended to create objective regimes from the general
rules which it lays down concerning the effects of treaties upon
third states. Unfortunately, since then, the trend indicates that the
concept of objective regime valid erga omnes has more likely been
seen in the light of Article 38 Vienna Convention than in such a
category that not yet covered by the Convention.
The division of opinion in the ILC on the question of objec-
tive regime may reflect the general position of the Socialist States at
that time upon the rule that obligations can not be imposed on third
States in the absence of their clear consent Curiously, this position
seems to be decline, since in dealing with The LOSC 1982, the
Soviet authors supports the idea mat the Convention would be law
for all states-even those that are outside its framework. 3
It is also interesting to note the case of Internationa! Status
of South West Africa which stated:
From time to time if happens that a group of great Powers, or a large
number of Suites both great and small, assumes a power to create by a
multipartite treaty some new international regime or status, which soon
extends beyond the limit of actual contracting parties, and giving it an
11 Sinclair, Op. CB; p. 105.
12 Art 12 of the Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in respect
of Treaties, 1975.
13 Danftenko, Gcnnady M, International Law Making, Perestroika and
International Law Editor Anthony Caraty and Gennady M Danilenko,
Eidenburgb,199Q9fKl9.
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objective existence. This power is used where some public interest is
involved.
The next question then is what the legal basis for the erga
omnes effect is. It can not be denied that the source of erga omnes
eifect of objective regime is a controversial issue. The traditional
approach contends that the source remains custom. It might be
argued, if such effect remains custom, can it be said that the
Antarctic Treaty, which is always being cited as a recent example of
creating an objective regime, imposes obligations erga omnes by
virtue of custom when a small number of states have became parties
to the treaty? McNair argues that the effect of certain kinds of
treaties erga omnes is to be attributed to some inherent and
distinctive juridical element in that treaty.
Further, Renter stated that when consents or institution flow
from a sufficiently representative group of States directly
(principally) interested in a question, these consents or institutions
can sometime produce effects in regard of third states. So the legal
basis of the objective effects of this category of treaties is to be
found not in the intention of the parties but in the consent of a
sufficiently representative group of States. It is very important with
regard to the multilateral treaties which establish an international
regime intended to produce objective lej^I effects.14
There is also an interesting argument saying that particular
areas belong to no state such as high seas, seabed, and outer space,
are under occupation of international community i.e. the United
Nations. On the basis of the rules of international law relating to
occupation of territory, in dealing with such areas, the United
Nations could enact, by a qualified majority, rules binding all
states.15
14 HaUoway, Kaye, Modern Trends in Treaty Law, London, 1967, j>. 583.
15 See Finn Seyersted'c comments on Realistic Approach to international
Law, in The Spirit of Uppsala, New York, 1984, edited by Atle Grahl-Madsen
and Jiri Toman, p. 267.
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There are four elements of the seabed regime which closely
related to this objective regime. Firstly, there is a legal change of
regime, from the high seas regime to a newly emerging regime,
from res comments concept to CHM. The two are fundamentally
different Res commwis regime implies free for all, and allow all
states to use the area or even to abuse it more or less it wishes,
including the appropriation of natural resources. Meanwhile, under
CHM principle thai the management, exploitation and distribution
of the natural resources of the Area in question are matters to be
decided by international community and are not to be left to the
initiative and discretion of individual states or their nationals. This
changing signifies tbat the new regime possesses universal or erga
omnes legal effect. Accordingly, no state can possibly claim that it
is still bound by high sea regime meanwhile other states are bound
by the new CHM regime.
Secondly, the regime is intended to have permanent and
general effect on a common area, a particular area which belongs to
all mankind. The regime governs the Area exclusively, Art 153 (1)
declares that All activities in the Area are to be organized, carried
out and controlled by the authority on behalf of mankind as a
whole. So it is to serve the geceial interest of all states or possesses
public character. It is in the interest of all mankind that the seabed
area shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes and shall be carried out for the benefit and interest of all
mankind.
Third, the regime establishes an international organization
(authority) possesses objective international personality, which is
valid erga omnes against all states. The Reparation for Injwries
Case 1949, noted the existence of international organizations of
states which possess international personality for the purpose of a
claim that exercisable against all states whether member or non-
member. The Court based its opinion on the number of participants
of the Organization and the aim to be pursued, thus recognized that
a certain legislative power could be possessed by a large group of
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states even though this did not comprise all States.16 It can be
argued then that the objective personality of International Seabed
Authority which will have its own resources and jurisdiction over
the Area and the right to control over activities in the Area should
be applicable to all states regardless parties or not to the LOSC
1982.
Fourth, the regime is created by common consent of a
sufficiently representative group of states. It is always being cited
that the negotiation process in the UNCLOS in reflected a trend
what so-called democratization of international relations. The basis
of decision making for the general interest in international commu-
nity has fundamentally shifted from power politics to democracy.
These elements significantly lead to the conclusion that the
seabed regime is an objective regime and therefore is valid erga
omnes.
This paper is not intended to consider whether the nature of
objective regime might also be invoked for the whole part of the
LOSC 1982, because such topic needs special consideration and
research. The seabed area (Part XI) has such a distinct nature that
more likely to consider in the context of objective regime. It is one
of international spaces (outer space and Antarctic, are among
others) which has allegedly been claimed as common heritage of
mankind. But the objective regime might be the legal answer to the
idea of many states and jurists to regard the LOSC 1982 as falling
into a special category with the reasons; the very scope of the
Convention suggest codification and progressive development on a
scale analogous to code making in municipal legal system, a near
exhaustive statement and formulation of the rules for a discrete
branch of law. During the debate on the Convention, a number of
states have expressed the opinion that the Convention created the
only valid law for the ocean space binding all states irrespective of
their participation. Many developing states claimed, in particular,
16 Hermann Moster, The International Society as a Legal Community, fa
Recueii des Cours, 1974, p. 235.
Volume 4 Nomor 2 Jamiari 2007 433
Jvmal Huktan Intemasional
that the Convention would be law for all states-even those that are
outside its framework. Furthermore, Group of 77 assert that Part XI
is landing upon all states because it stems from the consensus
declaration of the UNGA and the crystallization of the concept and
has therefore become a peremptory norm of international law. The
view of which can not sufficiently be approached merely by the
traditional source of international law under the rubric of the inter-
relations of treaty and customs.
In feet, some rules provided within Part XI seem incompati-
ble with the nature of objective regime. The seabed regime does not
enforce erga omnes principle thoroughly. Instead, it also makes a
legal distinction between state parties and non-state parties in
carrying out certain rights and obligations arise from the regime.
The discriminated application in one hand and erga omnes
application on the other hand in dealing with an area of common
heritage of mankind clearly incompatible with the nature of an
objective regime.
The provisions stipulate erga omnes principle are such as.
Azt 137 which says:
anv part qfdre Area or £& resources, nor shall anv State or natural
or judicial person appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or
exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights nor such appropriation
shatt be recognized,
(3) No State or natural or judicial person shall claim, acquire or
exercise rights with respect to the minerals recovered from the Area
except in accordance with this part. Otherwise, no such claim,
acquisition or exercise of such rights shall be recognized
These paragraphs which ate reflecting the agreed principle
of CHM impose obligations to all states without any discrimination
whether parties or not This construction is consistent to erga omnes
nature. To do otherwise the paragraph undoubtedly becomes
meaningless. Art 153:1 is also correct in stating that the Authority
shall organize and control activities in the Area. In carrying such
rights the Authority performs on behalf of mankind not of state
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parties. Unfortunately, when the principle further implemented into
institutional level or exploitation system, the rights do not confer on
all states. Art 157 states that only state parties through the authority
organize and control activities in the area. Undoubtedly, this rule is
inconsistent to objective regime because it ignores other states as
commoners.
It might be said that the objective regime was created in the
wrong arrangement, or, it may also right to state that the objective
regime is confronted by the existing traditional principle of
international law, which based on state sovereignty, so the
consequence is that the distinction of state parties and non-state
parties as reflecting the sacred element of state's sovereignty
(consent of states to the Convention) is definitely required. From
this point of view, it can be best concluded that a common area or a
common resources such as seabed (Area) should not be dealt with
based on legal distinction of state parties and non-state parties, but
should be based on erga omnes principle, under which all states
should be treated without any legal discrimination.
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